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During the first week of December, President Trump brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This contrast exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and conflict resolution—though how this fits with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This shift is consequential, but analysts caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Selective Involvement

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.